{"id":11,"date":"2026-01-30T18:15:25","date_gmt":"2026-01-30T18:15:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/web110richardson.mydcts.org\/?page_id=11"},"modified":"2026-02-13T19:40:56","modified_gmt":"2026-02-13T19:40:56","slug":"1964-1973","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/web110richardson.mydcts.org\/index.php\/1964-1973\/","title":{"rendered":"1964\u20131973"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
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On 2 August 1964, USS Maddox<\/em><\/a>, on an intelligence mission along North Vietnam’s coast, fired upon and damaged torpedo boats approaching it in the Gulf of Tonkin.[57]<\/a><\/sup>:\u200a124\u200a<\/sup> A second attack was reported two days later on USS Turner Joy<\/em><\/a> and Maddox<\/em>. The circumstances were murky.[23]<\/a><\/sup>:\u200a218\u2013219\u200a<\/sup> Johnson commented to Undersecretary of State George Ball that “those sailors out there may have been shooting at flying fish.”[172]<\/a><\/sup> An NSA<\/a> publication declassified in 2005 revealed there was no attack on 4 August. [173]<\/a><\/sup> The second “attack” led to retaliatory airstrikes<\/a>, and prompted Congress to approve the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution<\/a> on 7 August.[174]<\/a><\/sup>:\u200a222\u2013244\u200a<\/sup> This granted the president power “to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression” and Johnson relied on this as giving him authority to expand the war.[23]<\/a><\/sup>:\u200a221\u200a<\/sup> Johnson pledged he was not “committing American boys to fighting a war that I think ought to be fought by the boys of Asia to help protect their own land”.[23]<\/a><\/sup>:\u200a227\u200a<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The National Security Council<\/a> recommended an escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam. Following an attack on a U.S. Army base<\/a> in February 1965,[175]<\/a><\/sup> airstrikes were initiated, while Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin<\/a> was on a state visit<\/a> to North Vietnam. Operation Rolling Thunder<\/a> and Operation Arc Light<\/a> expanded aerial bombardment and ground support operations.[176]<\/a><\/sup> The bombing campaign, which lasted three years, was intended to force North Vietnam to cease support for the VC by threatening to destroy North Vietnamese air defenses and infrastructure. It was additionally aimed at bolstering South Vietnamese morale.[177]<\/a><\/sup> Between 1965 and 1968, Rolling Thunder<\/em> deluged the north with a million tons of missiles, rockets and bombs.[178]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

Strategies & Warfare<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The U.S Approach<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

Operation Rolling Thunder<\/strong> was a gradual and sustained aerial bombardment<\/a> campaign conducted by the United States (U.S.) 2nd Air Division<\/a> (later Seventh Air Force<\/a>), U.S. Navy<\/a>, and Republic of Vietnam Air Force<\/a> (RVNAF) against North Vietnam<\/a> from 2 March 1965 until 2 November 1968, during the Vietnam War<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The objectives of the operation (which evolved over time) were to boost the morale of South Vietnam<\/a>; to force North Vietnam to stop sending soldiers and materiel<\/a> into South Vietnam to fight in the communist insurgency<\/a>; and to destroy North Vietnam’s transportation system, industrial base, and air defenses. Attainment of these objectives was made difficult by both the restraints imposed upon the U.S. and its allies by Cold War<\/a> exigencies, and the military aid and assistance received by North Vietnam from its communist allies, the Soviet Union<\/a>, the People’s Republic of China<\/a> and North Korea<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The operation became the most intense air\/ground battle waged during the Cold War period; it was the most difficult such campaign fought by the United States since the aerial bombardment of Germany during World War II<\/a>. Supported by its communist allies, North Vietnam fielded a potent mixture of MiG fighter-interceptor jets and sophisticated air-to-air and surface-to-air weapons that created one of the most effective air defenses ever faced by American military aviators. The limited effectiveness of the operation and the pursuit of peace talks led to the scaling back of the operation in March 1968 and its cancellation in November 1968.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The North\/VC Approach<\/h3>\n\n\n\n

The North Vietnamese supplied and directed the Viet Cong<\/a> (VC), a common front<\/a> of dissidents in the south which intensified a guerrilla war<\/a> from 1957. In 1958, North Vietnam invaded Laos<\/a>, establishing the Ho Chi Minh trail<\/a> to supply the VC. By 1963, the north had covertly sent 40,000 soldiers of its People’s Army of Vietnam<\/a> (PAVN), armed with Soviet and Chinese weapons, to fight in the insurgency in the south.The quality of the South Vietnamese military, however, remained poor.

Poor leadership, corruption, and political promotions weakened the ARVN. The frequency of guerrilla attacks rose as the insurgency gathered steam. While Hanoi’s support for the VC played a role, South Vietnamese governmental incompetence was at the core of the crisis.[103]<\/a>:\u200a369\u200a<\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Tet Offensive<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

The Tet Offensive<\/strong>[a]<\/a><\/sup> was both a major escalation and one of the largest military campaigns of the Vietnam War<\/a>. The North Vietnamese<\/a> People’s Army of Vietnam<\/a> (PAVN) and the Viet Cong<\/a> (VC) launched a surprise attack on 30 and 31 January 1968 against the forces of the South Vietnamese<\/a> Army of the Republic of Vietnam<\/a> (ARVN), the United States Armed Forces<\/a> and their allies<\/a>, targeting military and civilian command and control centers throughout South Vietnam.[18]<\/a><\/sup> The name is the truncated version of the Lunar New Year festival name in Vietnamese, T\u1ebft Nguy\u00ean \u0110\u00e1n<\/a>, a holiday period when most ARVN personnel were on leave.[19]<\/a><\/sup> The intended outcome of the wide-scale offensive by the Le Duan’s<\/a> Politburo<\/a> was to trigger political instability and that mass armed assaults on urban centers would trigger defections<\/a> and uprisings<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

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The offensive was launched prematurely in the early morning hours of 30 January in large parts of the I<\/a> and II Corps Tactical Zones<\/a> of South Vietnam. This early attack allowed allied forces some time to prepare defensive measures. When the main operation began during the early morning of 31 January, the offensive was countrywide; 77,000 PAVN\/VC troops struck more than 100 towns and cities, including 36 of 44 provincial capitals, 5 of 6 autonomous cities, 72 of 245 district towns, and the capital Saigon<\/a>.[17]<\/a><\/sup>:\u200a8\u200a<\/sup> The offensive was the largest military operation conducted by either side by that point in the war.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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Hanoi had launched the offensive in the belief that it would trigger a popular uprising leading to the collapse of the South Vietnamese government. Although the initial attacks stunned the allies and lost them several cities temporarily, they quickly regrouped, repelled the attacks, and inflicted heavy casualties on PAVN\/VC forces. The popular uprising anticipated by Hanoi never materialized. During the Battle of Hu\u1ebf<\/a>, intense fighting lasted for a month, resulting in the destruction of the city. During its occupation, PAVN\/VC forces executed thousands of people in the Massacre at Hu\u1ebf<\/a>. Around the American combat base at Khe Sanh<\/a>, fighting continued for two more months.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

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The offensive was a military defeat for North Vietnam, and neither uprisings nor ARVN unit defections occurred in South Vietnam. However, this offensive had far-reaching consequences for its effect on the views of the Vietnam War by the American public and the international community. The offensive had a strong effect on the U.S. government and shocked the American public, which had been led to believe by its political and military leaders that the North Vietnamese were being defeated and incapable of launching such an ambitious military operation. American public support for the war declined as a result of the Tet casualties and the escalation of draft calls.[20]<\/a><\/sup> Subsequently, the Johnson administration<\/a> sought negotiations<\/a> to end the war. Shortly before the 1968 United States presidential election<\/a>, Republican candidate and former vice president Richard Nixon<\/a> encouraged South Vietnamese president Nguy\u1ec5n V\u0103n Thi\u1ec7u<\/a> to become publicly uncooperative in the negotiations, casting doubt on Johnson’s ability to bring peace.[21]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n

The name “Tet Offensive” usually refers to the January\u2013February 1968 offensive, but also can be extended to cover all of the 21 weeks of intense combat after the initial attacks in January (including the “Mini-Tet<\/a>” offensive in May), or the Phase III offensive<\/a> in August.[22]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Vietnamization<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Nixon began troop withdrawals in 1969. His plan to build up the ARVN so it could take over defense of South Vietnam became known as “Vietnamization<\/a>“. As the PAVN\/VC recovered from their 1968 losses and avoided contact, Abrams conducted operations aimed at disrupting logistics, with better use of firepower and more cooperation with the ARVN.[23]<\/a>:\u200a517\u200a<\/sup> In October 1969, Nixon had ordered B-52s with nuclear weapons to race to the border of Soviet airspace<\/a> to convince the Soviets, in accordance with the madman theory<\/a>, he was capable of anything to end the war.[224]<\/a>[225]<\/a><\/sup> Nixon had sought d\u00e9tente<\/a><\/em> with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with China<\/a>, which decreased tensions and led to nuclear arms reductions. However, the Soviets continued to supply North Vietnam.[226]<\/a>[227]<\/a><\/sup>

The anti-war movement<\/a> was gaining strength in the US. Nixon appealed to the “silent majority<\/a>” who he said supported the war. But revelations of the 1968 My Lai massacre<\/a>,[23]<\/a><\/sup>:\u200a518\u2013521\u200a<\/sup> in which a US Army unit raped and killed civilians, and the 1969 “Green Beret Affair<\/a>“, where Special Forces<\/a> soldiers were arrested for the murder[230]<\/a><\/sup> of a suspected double agent,[231]<\/a><\/sup> provoked outrage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

In 1971, the Pentagon Papers<\/a><\/em> were leaked to The New York Times<\/a><\/em>. The secret history of US involvement, commissioned by the Department of Defense, detailed public deceptions by the government. The Supreme Court<\/a> ruled publication legal.[232]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Paris Peace Accords<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

Vietnamization was again tested by the Easter Offensive<\/a> of 1972, a conventional PAVN invasion of South Vietnam. The PAVN overran the northern provinces and attacked from Cambodia, threatening to cut the country in half. US troop withdrawals continued, but American airpower responded, beginning Operation Linebacker<\/a>, and the offensive was halted.[23]<\/a><\/sup>:\u200a606\u2013637\u200a<\/sup> The US Navy initiated Operation Pocket Money<\/a> in May, an aerial mining campaign in Haiphong<\/a> Harbor that prevented North Vietnam’s allies from resupplying it with weapons.[254]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The war was central to the 1972 U.S. presidential election<\/a> as Nixon’s opponent, George McGovern<\/a>, campaigned on immediate withdrawal. Nixon’s Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger<\/a>, had continued secret negotiations with North Vietnam’s L\u00ea \u0110\u1ee9c Th\u1ecd<\/a> and in October 1972 reached an agreement. Thi\u1ec7u demanded changes to the peace accord upon its discovery, and when North Vietnam went public with the details, the Nixon administration claimed they were attempting to embarrass the president. The negotiations became deadlocked when Hanoi demanded changes. To show his support for South Vietnam and force Hanoi back to the negotiating table, Nixon ordered Operation Linebacker II<\/a>, a bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong in December.[23]<\/a><\/sup>:\u200a649\u2013663\u200a<\/sup> Nixon pressured Thi\u1ec7u to accept the agreement or face military action.[255]<\/a><\/sup><\/p>\n\n\n\n

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\"Picture<\/figure>\n\n\n\n

On 15 January 1973, all US combat activities were suspended. L\u00ea \u0110\u1ee9c Th\u1ecd and Henry Kissinger, along with the PRG Foreign Minister Nguy\u1ec5n Th\u1ecb B\u00ecnh<\/a> and a reluctant Thi\u1ec7u, signed the Paris Peace Accords<\/a> on 27 January.[195]<\/a><\/sup>:\u200a508\u2013513\u200a<\/sup> This ended direct U.S. involvement in the war, created a ceasefire between North Vietnam\/PRG and South Vietnam, guaranteed the territorial integrity of Vietnam under the Geneva Conference, called for elections or a political settlement between the PRG and South Vietnam, allowed 200,000 communist troops to remain in the south, and agreed to a POW exchange. There was a 60-day period for the withdrawal of US forces. “This article proved … to be the only one…which was fully carried out.”[256]<\/a><\/sup> All US forces personnel were withdrawn by March.[107]<\/a><\/sup>:\u200a260\u200a<\/sup><\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident On 2 August 1964, USS Maddox, on an intelligence mission along North Vietnam’s coast, fired upon and damaged torpedo boats approaching it in the Gulf of Tonkin.[57]:\u200a124\u200a A second attack was reported two days later on USS Turner Joy and Maddox. The circumstances were murky.[23]:\u200a218\u2013219\u200a Johnson commented to Undersecretary of State George Ball that “those sailors out there […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"page-with-title","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-11","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/web110richardson.mydcts.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/11","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/web110richardson.mydcts.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/web110richardson.mydcts.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/web110richardson.mydcts.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/web110richardson.mydcts.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11"}],"version-history":[{"count":10,"href":"https:\/\/web110richardson.mydcts.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/11\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":161,"href":"https:\/\/web110richardson.mydcts.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/11\/revisions\/161"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/web110richardson.mydcts.org\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}